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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been 
complicated from the very start.  I have seen this first-hand serving as a U.S. 
government official in several administrations—first just after the Rome Stat-
ute was adopted, and most recently in the Obama Administration’s small-but-
mighty Office of Global Criminal Justice at the State Department. 
Yet, even so, it is fair to say the U.S.-ICC relationship is currently at a new 
low point, with John Bolton’s September 2018 speech attacking the Court and 
threatening its personnel as the most visible manifestation.1  Bolton, of course, 
has been a repeat protagonist in this story.  He led earlier U.S. efforts to un-
dercut the ICC in the first George W. Bush Administration—that is, until  
President Bush himself changed course and decided the ICC offered the best 
prospect for justice for atrocity victims in Darfur, Sudan, a situation which the 
UN Security Council referred to the ICC.2  Indeed, President Bush’s second 
term saw a greater recognition of ways in which aspects of the ICC’s work 
could be consistent with U.S. interests.3 
This trend continued and intensified in the Obama Administration, which 
decided to constructively and pragmatically engage with the ICC and support 
its work, on a case-by-case basis, consistent with U.S. law and interests.4  In 
so doing, the Administration supported the UN Security Council’s referral of 
 
     1 Bolton’s Remarks on the International Criminal Court, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60674/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks 
-international-criminal-court/ [hereinafter Bolton’s Remarks]. 
 2 Michael Abramowitz & Colin Lynch, Darfur Killings Soften Bush’s Opposition to 
International Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101101964.html; Nora Boustany, Official Floats 
Possibility of Assistance to Hague Court, WASH. POST (June 12, 2007), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/11/AR2007061102347_pf.html. 
 3 Jess Bravin, U.S. Accepts International Criminal Court, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 26, 
2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120917156494046579; John B. Bellinger, III, Le-
gal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going (Apr. 25, 2008); John B. Bellinger, III, Con-
gress Should Review Policy Toward War Crimes Court, WASH. POST (June 21, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-review-policies-toward-war-
crimes-court/2012/06/21/gJQAN9RgtV_story.html?.  The American Service-Members’ 
Protection Act of 2002 places statutory limits on various forms of U.S. support to the ICC.  
American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 
(2002). 
 4 Ambassador Stephen Rapp, U.S. Statement to the Assembly of States Parties of the 
International Criminal Court (Dec. 14, 2011); OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY 1, 22 (Feb. 2015) (“We will work with the international community 
to prevent and call to account those responsible for the worst human rights abuses, includ-
ing through support to the International Criminal Court, consistent with U.S. law and our 
commitment to protecting our personnel.  Moreover, we will continue to mobilize allies 
and partners to strengthen our collective efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities 
using all our instruments of national power.”). 
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the situation in Libya to the ICC and assisted in turning over major ICC in-
dictees to the Court, including Lord’s Resistance Army commander 
Dominique Ongwen and Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda, both of whom 
are on trial before the ICC.5  The United States also expanded and offered 
rewards through its War Crimes Rewards Program for information contrib-
uting to the arrest and surrender of designated foreign nationals wanted by the 
ICC and other international tribunals.6 
The Obama Administration also engaged diplomatically with the ICC to 
express U.S. views and advance U.S. interests.  American officials partici-
pated at the Kampala negotiations over the crime of aggression, securing a 
result that protected non-parties to the ICC from the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression.7  The United States also attended the annual ICC 
Assembly of States Parties meetings as an observer delegation.8  The Obama 
Administration expressed support for each of the cases before the Court, while 
also actively supporting a range of domestic and hybrid courts whose work 
was complementary to the ICC in bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes to 
justice.9 
Notwithstanding these important trends and developments across both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, the possibility that the ICC 
might commence an investigation concerning the situation in Afghanistan was 
always a challenging issue looming on the horizon.  Both the Bush and Obama 
 
5 Julia Crawford, We Have Helped the ICC, Says Departing US War Crimes Ambassa-
dor, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/mixed-
tribunals/1511-we-have-helped-the-icc-says-departing-us-war-crimes-ambassador.html. 
6 The U.S. War Crimes Rewards Program offers rewards of up to five million dollars 
for information leading to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of designated foreign nationals 
charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes by international, mixed, or 
hybrid criminal tribunals.  Key Topics – Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-global-criminal-justice/#rewards (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2019).  This program has been instrumental in apprehending fugitives ac-
cused of atrocity crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  Designated 
individuals include Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, and Sylvestre Mu-
dacumura of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), among others.  
Fugitives from Justice (Submit a Tip), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j 
/gcj/wcrp/c56848.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2019). 
7 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Review Conference, The 
Crime of Aggression, ICC Res. RC/Res.6, Art. 15 bis, para. 5 (June 11, 2010) (“In respect 
of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.”). 
8 David Clarke, U.S. to Attend Hague Court Meeting as Observer, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 
2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-icc/u-s-to-attend-hague-court-meeting-as-
observer-idUSTRE5AF30A20091116. 
9 Jane Stromseth, Why the U.S. Needs the Office of Global Criminal Justice Led by a 
Senate-Confirmed Ambassador-at-Large, JUST SECURITY (July 26, 2017), https://www.ju 
stsecurity.org/43554/u-s-office-global-criminal-justice-led-senate-confirmed-ambassa-
dor-at-large/. 
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Administrations sought to protect nationals of the United States—a non-party 
to the ICC—from exposure to the jurisdiction of the Court in the absence of 
U.S. consent, while also recognizing the value in other aspects of the Court’s 
work.  Moreover, navigating the complex and evolving U.S.-ICC relationship 
required calm, careful and astute diplomacy. 
Yet Bolton’s shrill attack on the ICC as a Trump Administration official 
was none of those things.  Indeed, it was even more extreme than his earlier 
efforts—in the nature of the threats against ICC personnel, in the scope of 
those potentially covered, and in the many exaggerated and false claims about 
the ICC.10  And his hostile posture towards the Court has been reinforced by 
others, including Secretary of State Pompeo and President Trump himself, and 
reflects a larger stance by the Trump Administration of skepticism and indeed 
often hostility toward multilateral institutions.11 
 
II. BOLTON’S ATTACK ON THE ICC 
 
Bolton claimed that the Trump Administration’s ICC policy “put[s] the 
interests of the American people FIRST.”12  But is this really true?  Is this 
aggressive stance and attack on the ICC the best way to advance U.S. inter-
ests?  That is the central question I will address.  I argue it is not, for three 
main reasons.  First, Bolton’s attack rests on an unduly narrow conception of 
the interests of the United States and the American people.  This conception 
takes insufficient account of the importance of standing up against atrocity 
crimes.  Second, Bolton’s attack ignores and undercuts important ICC contri-
butions to the pursuit of justice and accountability—including encouraging 
national efforts the U.S. has long supported.  Third, it disregards the more 
effective ways to navigate issues growing out of the ICC’s decade-long ex-
amination of the situation in Afghanistan and the more constructive ways to 
address U.S. concerns about the ICC.  In short, Bolton’s approach is neither 
 
 10 Alex Whiting, Why John Bolton vs. Int’l Criminal Court 2.0 is Different from Version 
1.0, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60680/international-
criminal-court-john-bolton-afghanistan-torture/. 
 11  Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Press (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQPUBo6Dy8k; Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, 
Remarks at the German Marshall Fund (Dec. 4, 2018); Gardiner Harris, Pompeo Questions 
the Value of International Groups Like U.N. and E.U., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/world/europe/pompeo-brussels-speech.html; Don-
ald Trump, President, Remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly (Sept. 25, 2018); Chimène Keitner, Sovereignty on Steroids: International Institutions 
and the Trump Administration’s “Ideology of Patriotism”, LAWFARE (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sovereignty-steroids-international-institutions-and-trump-
administrations-ideology-patriotism. 
 12 Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1. 
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the best way to support an affirmative agenda of accountability, nor is it the 
best defensive strategy. 
First, Bolton is so focused on attacking the ICC that he fails to 
acknowledge or adequately appreciate the deep and longstanding stake the 
United States has in affirmatively supporting justice and accountability for 
mass atrocity crimes.  Indeed, the United States—on a largely bipartisan ba-
sis—has long supported advancing justice for international atrocity crimes—
including genocide, forced recruitment of child soldiers, mass rape, and other 
egregious crimes—recognizing that standing up against these atrocities ad-
vances both U.S. interests and values.  This includes both advancing a norm 
that such atrocities are unacceptable and a tangible legacy of supporting a 
range of tribunals—national, hybrid, and international—to bring perpetrators 
to account.  Let us call this the affirmative agenda. 
Examples include American leadership in establishing the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals after World War II and helping to build the vital framework 
of international humanitarian law.  Examples also include U.S. support for the 
Security Council’s creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as U.S. support for 
numerous hybrid courts such as in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, the Cen-
tral African Republic, and elsewhere, and for domestic processes such as the 
mobile courts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have brought to 
justice perpetrators of atrocity crimes.13 
Why does this advance U.S. interests?  It does so for both normative and 
pragmatic reasons.  Normatively, these efforts affirm the most fundamental 
standards of human conduct.  The prohibitions against mass atrocities reflect 
legal rules the United States has sought to advance on a bipartisan basis along 
with many other countries for decades, aiming to protect civilians from harm 
and to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering.  And better enforce-
ment not only brings some measure of justice to victims; it also helps build an 
architecture of accountability—at the national, regional, and international lev-
els—that, over time, can help to strengthen prospects for prevention of these 
atrocities. 
There are also very pragmatic reasons why strengthening enforcement of 
this body of law is in the interest of the United States.  These include conflict 
resolution:  Atrocities can fuel an ongoing cycle of grievance and inflame 
conflicts—with profound security consequences—including desperate popu-
lations fleeing across borders and regional instability.  This often puts the 
United States and its allies and partners in the challenging position of facing 
options, such as military intervention, that are far more costly and difficult 
 
13 Stromseth, supra note 9; Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Is-
sues, Office of Glob. Criminal Justice, Intervention of the United States Observer Delega-
tion (Dec. 15, 2014). 
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than earlier efforts aimed at structural prevention.14  And failure to seek any 
credible measure of accountability can fuel pressures for retributive violence, 
making prospects for rebuilding after conflict all the more difficult. 
Another pragmatic issue concerns coalitions and partnerships.  American 
commitment to these rules and their enforcement helps to reinforce the legit-
imacy of military operations and aids in coalition-building with allies and 
friends, whose support is often critical for success.15  Furthermore, the United 
States often works with and through partners in foreign militaries, providing 
forms of support other than direct combat operations and thus has a strong 
stake in how those partners conduct themselves.  If the United States is to help 
build professional and accountable partners, who are seen as protectors and 
not predators, the law prohibiting atrocity crimes (and meaningful enforce-
ment) is a vital part of training and education. 
In John Bolton’s account, however, we hear about virtually none of this.  
Nowhere does the long history of U.S. contributions to international justice 
appear.  The positive agenda is hardly acknowledged.  Never mentioned are 
the contributions of leading American lawyers—including Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Jackson, Judge Patricia Wald and many others—who have 
served as prosecutors, judges, or defense attorneys in international and hybrid 
criminal courts that have held perpetrators of atrocity crimes to account.16  
 
14 Exec. Order No. 13729 (May 18, 2016), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/con-
tent/pkg/DCPD-201600329/html/DCPD-201600329.htm (“governmental engagement on 
mass atrocities and genocide too often arrives too late, when opportunities for prevention 
or low-cost, low-risk action have been missed”). 
 15 For these and additional reasons, it is crucial that the United States continues to hold 
our own forces accountable for violations of the law of armed conflict through fair and 
credible domestic processes, and not (as President Trump is reportedly considering) offer-
ing pardons that threaten to undercut the U.S. system of military justice (over the strong 
opposition of U.S. military leaders).  David S. Cloud, Senior Military Officers Rebel 
Against Trump Plan to Pardon Troops Accused of War Crimes, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 
2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-pentagon-oppose-trump-pardon-mur-
der-warcrimes-20190522-story.html; Dave Philipps, Trump May Be Preparing Pardons 
for Servicemen Accused of War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/05/18/us/trump-pardons-war-crimes.html.  As senior U.S. officers empha-
size, “adherence to the law of armed conflict greatly contributes to combat success, reduces 
overall suffering, maintains our military members’ moral integrity, aligns with American 
values, and gains American allies around the world.”  Donald J. Guter, Real Admiral, 
JAGC, USN (Ret.), John D. Hutson, Rear Admiral, JAGC, USN (Ret.), and Rachel Van-
Landingham, Lt. Col, USAF (Ret.), The American Way of War Includes Fidelity to Law: 
Preemptive Pardons Break that Code, JUST SECURITY (May 24, 2019), https://www.just-
security.org/64260/the-american-way-of-war-includes-fidelity-to-law-preemptive-par-
dons-break-that-code/.  In contrast, “impunity for violations corrodes confidence in lead-
ership; challenges the moral foundation of the men and women put under arms; increases 
the enemy’s will to resist; and undermines the broader legitimacy of military action.”  Id. 
16 For a recent discussion of the contributions of Justice Robert Jackson and other Amer-
icans to international criminal justice, see Chile Eboe-Osuji, President, International 
2019] WHY UNDERMINING THE ICC UNDERCUTS U.S. INTERESTS 645 
Also invisible from Bolton’s narrative is the work of U.S. lawyers and diplo-
mats to ensure the ICC is based on the primacy of national accountability for 
the most egregious atrocity crimes. 
There is a second fundamental reason why Bolton’s strident attack on the 
ICC does not effectively advance U.S. interests.  Namely, it ignores and un-
dercuts important contributions the ICC is making to the pursuit of justice and 
accountability—including its role in encouraging the national efforts that the 
U.S. has long supported. 
To be sure, the ICC is an imperfect institution facing many acute problems, 
particularly today.  The Court is struggling not only with longstanding chal-
lenges (concerning expectations, institutional capacity, and critiques about its 
legitimacy) but also with new ones.  These include high-level acquittals that 
have raised questions about prosecutorial choices and ability to present suffi-
cient evidence to meet its burden of proof; deeply divided and sometimes 
poorly reasoned judicial decisions in a number of cases; two recent state with-
drawals; and preliminary examinations and investigations that bring the Pros-
ecutor’s focus to non-state parties, who are likely to strenuously resist the 
Court’s work.  So, the ICC’s ability to make progress in building a track rec-
ord of successful prosecutions in fair proceedings, to catalyze national ac-
countability proceedings, and to contribute to prevention of atrocity crimes is 
at a particularly challenging moment.   
Yet, despite its limitations and many challenges, the ICC also has some 
important things going for it.  It is based fundamentally on the principle of 
complementarity and the primacy of national accountability processes—an 
idea the United States strongly supports.17  Deliberately designed to be a court 
of last resort, the ICC’s complementarity principle encourages justice to be 
pursued nationally in directly affected communities when possible, aiming to 
reinforce efforts to build genuine domestic justice processes.18  The hope is 
domestic rule of law capacity as the first line of defense against atrocities will 
be strengthened as a result. 
Hurling a “wrecking ball”19 at the ICC undermines crucial efforts to 
strengthen legal accountability in the national courts of  many of the countries 
 
Criminal Court, A Tribute to Robert H. Jackson – Recalling America’s Contributions to 
International Criminal Justice (Mar. 29, 2019). 
17  The United States has provided support over many years to a wide range of national 
and hybrid accountability processes to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes.  For dis-
cussion of some of these efforts, see Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues, Office of Glob. Criminal Justice, Statement of the U.S. at the Twelfth Ses-
sion of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (Nov. 21, 2013). 
18 For an analysis of the aims and many challenges of complementarity, see Pressure 
Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice, Lessons from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, 
and the United Kingdom, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/report_pdf/ij0418_web_0.pdf. 
 19 Whiting, supra note 10. 
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emerging from conflict—the very processes Bolton claims to support.20  In-
deed, in a number of countries—including Guinea and the Central African 
Republic (CAR)—the ICC is working to actively encourage21 and even assist 
domestic accountability efforts.  So, too, in Colombia, the ICC’s ongoing pre-
liminary examination since 2004 helped influence the inclusion of justice pro-
visions in the peace agreement, with the implementation of that agreement 
still very much a work in progress.22 
At the domestic level, the ICC has also helped empower civil society ad-
vocates for justice as they press their own governments for better accounta-
bility.23  These efforts are consistent with longstanding U.S. support for civil 
society human rights defenders and justice advocates under Republican and 
Democratic administrations alike.24 
The ICC should be encouraged in its efforts to catalyze domestic account-
ability, such as in Guinea, CAR, and Colombia.  It is counterproductive to 
undercut this work by a broadside assault on the ICC—an assault that fails to 
take account of its important catalyzing impacts in promising situations and 
ignores the considerable support the Court continues to enjoy among many 
victims and advocates for justice in countries around the world. 
What if reliance on purely domestic action in conflict-ridden societies is 
not possible or sufficient?  In a number of such cases, prior Republican and 
Democratic administrations have looked to the ICC and found the Court’s in-
volvement to be consonant with U.S. interests, concluding that the ICC of-
fered the best or even the only realistic option for accountability and justice 
for victims.25  Such situations no doubt will continue to present themselves, 
and the ICC’s availability in such circumstances may offer an important op-
tion for justice and a source of hope for victims of egregious atrocities.  Work-
ing to build stronger accountability for mass atrocities—in national courts 
 
 20 Bolton Remarks, supra note 1 (“perpetrators should face legitimate, effective, and ac-
countable prosecution for their crimes, by sovereign national governments.”). 
 21 Jane Stromseth, Is the ICC Making a Difference?, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/47717/icc-making-difference/. 
22 Marina Aksenova, The ICC Involvement in Colombia: Walking the Fine Line Between 
Peace and Justice, in Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., Quality Control in Prelimi-
nary Examination: Volume I, TORKEL OPSAHL ACADEMIC EPUBLISHER (Sept. 6, 2018), 
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5b3704/pdf/; Rene Uruena, Prosecutorial Politics: The 
ICC’s Influence in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003-2017, 111 AJIL 104 (2017). 
23 Stromseth, supra note 21. 
24 Id. 
 25 Examples include the Bush Administration’s support for ICC action regarding Darfur, 
Sudan, Boustany, supra note 2, and the Obama administration’s support for ICC action in 
Mali.  Press Release, Mark C. Toner, Deputy Dep’t Spokesperson, ICC Judgment in Mali 
Cultural Destruction Case (Sept. 27, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/0 
9/262507.htm.  The United States has also supported combined efforts by both the ICC and 
hybrid or national courts, as in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Rapp, supra note 13. 
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when possible, in hybrid courts, and before the ICC—together can reinforce 
the fundamental prohibitions against atrocity crimes, chip away at impunity, 
and help bolster prospects for prevention. 
All of these reasons underscore why the U.S. government—over the last 
decade—generally sought to respond carefully and prudently to the prospect 
of an ICC investigation concerning Afghanistan, while not undercutting the 
larger system of accountability of which the ICC is a part. 
This brings me to my third reason why Bolton’s aggressive attack on the 
ICC and continuing threats against ICC personnel is not in the interest of the 
United States.  Namely, this approach disregards more constructive ways to 
navigate the complex issues growing out of the ICC’s decade-long examina-
tion of the situation in Afghanistan and overlooks more effective ways to ad-
dress U.S. concerns about the ICC more generally. 
To be sure, the U.S. government has articulated a number of concerns 
about the ICC from the beginning.  These include a strong preference for na-
tional accountability (reflected to a significant degree in the complementarity 
principles in the Rome Statute) and a resistance to an international court that 
could subject nationals of non-parties to its jurisdiction in the absence of UN 
Security Council referral or state consent.26  Rooted in confidence in the U.S. 
domestic constitutional system and in concerns that the United States’ signif-
icant global role and military deployments abroad would make it an attractive 
target for ICC investigations, the U.S. posture also reflects a longstanding his-
torical reluctance to subject itself to international courts without its consent.27 
At the same time, the United States, as noted earlier, has been a strong 
supporter of international and hybrid justice mechanisms in the post-WWII 
period.  Some of these mechanisms were created through the UN Security 
Council (in the case of the ICTY and ICTR), or with state consent and inter-
national or regional support in the case of hybrids. 
In short, the U.S. posture toward the ICC has always been an amalgam of 
competing dynamics—including affirmative support for accountability 
through various mechanisms (the positive agenda) but also a defensive agenda 
regarding any potential ICC assertion of jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.  
Prior to the Trump Administration, the challenge for those serving in govern-
ment was navigating these dynamics—these two strands—astutely and 
calmly: advancing the positive agenda as effectively as possible while also 
clearly conveying U.S. concerns regarding the ICC. 
 
   26 William J. Clinton, President, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Crim-
inal Court (Dec. 31, 2000); Marc Grossman, Under Sec’y of State for Political Affairs, 
American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court (May 6, 2002). 
 27 Id.  For analysis of the often-ambivalent U.S. relationship to the United Nations and 
various UN agencies, see EDWARD C. LUCK, MIXED MESSAGES: AMERICAN POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1919-1999 (1999). 
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Major U.S. policy statements sought to make sure that affirmative U.S. 
support for accountability through a variety of mechanisms was not drowned 
out by expressed concerns about the ICC.  The exceptions were the tirades 
against the ICC by John Bolton then and now.  During the Bush Administra-
tion, for example, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc 
Grossman, affirmed U.S. support for the important work of the ICTY, ICTR, 
and the hybrid courts in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere to bring per-
petrators of grave crimes to account.28  The Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, spoke eloquently during the Obama Admin-
istration at the annual ICC Assembly of States Parties meeting about U.S. 
support for justice for victims of mass atrocities at the national and interna-
tional levels.29  He and the dedicated team in the State Department’s Office of 
Global Criminal Justice worked tirelessly to pursue justice for victims, includ-
ing those in Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, South Su-
dan, and many other places.30 
Yet the U.S. defensive concerns were always there, brought into increas-
ingly sharp focus in the Afghanistan situation.  After Afghanistan became a 
party to the ICC treaty in 2003, and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) com-
menced a preliminary examination in 2006, the possibility that the ICC might 
open an investigation hovered over the evolving U.S. relationship with the 
ICC.31  Because the United States is not a party to the ICC, the clear policy of 
successive U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, has been 
to protect U.S. personnel from exposure to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction.32  
But the key question was how best to do this, and also how best to grapple 
domestically with the awful reality of the post-9/11 torture and abuse of a 
number of detainees in U.S. custody—abuse documented by the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence in its public report and by other reports and 
studies.33 
As the ICC Prosecutor’s annual reports on preliminary examinations in-
creasingly made clear, an Afghanistan investigation—if authorized by the 
 
 28 Grossman, supra note 26. 
 29 For examples, see Ambassador Stephen Rapp, United States Statement, Assembly of 
States Parties of the ICC (Dec. 14, 2011); Stephen Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for Glob. 
Criminal Justice, Intervention of the United States Observer Delegation, 13th Assembly of 
States Parties (Dec. 11, 2014). 
 30 Stromseth, supra note 9. 
31 Stephen Pomper, The Int’l Criminal Court’s Case Against the United States in Af-
ghanistan: How it Happened and What the Future Holds, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/46990/international-criminal-courts-case-u-s-afghanistan-
happened-future-holds/. 
32 Id. 
 33 S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014); S. REP. NO. 110-54 (2008); The Report of The Constitu-
tion Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT (2013), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/constitution-project-report-on-
detainee-treatment_0.pdf. 
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ICC Pre-Trial Chamber—would likely not be limited to an investigation of 
the ongoing Taliban atrocity crimes, including deliberate attacks against ci-
vilians and persecution of women and girls, and the allegations of detainee 
abuse by Afghan government forces.34  An investigation was also likely to 
include scrutiny of allegations of mistreatment and torture of detainees by 
U.S. forces and CIA personnel in Afghanistan, and on the territory of other 
ICC state parties following the 9/11 attacks, particularly between 2003 and 
2004.35  Such an investigation would no doubt be fraught with challenges for 
both the United States and the ICC. 
But there are calmer and far more constructive ways for the United States 
to respond to these challenges than Bolton’s frontal attack on the ICC and 
threats to ban, sanction, and even potentially prosecute ICC personnel. 
First of all, there was time to navigate the situation more carefully.  For 
one thing, because the United States is not a party to the treaty that created the 
ICC, it is not legally obligated to cooperate in such an investigation and indeed 
is restricted by U.S. statute from doing so.36  Moreover, any investigation, had 
it been authorized, would likely take years.37  Thus, there was time for the 
United States to calmly assess how to navigate adroitly through this terrain 
with careful consideration of all that was at stake. 
Second, instead of bullying tactics, the United States could have focused 
on arguments that could carry persuasive traction.  These include arguments 
invoking the OTP’s Policy Papers on Case Selection and Prioritization38 and 
on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes39 and emphasizing that ongoing Taliban 
crimes warrant a priority focus, including Taliban attacks directed against 
 
34 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT ¶¶ 246-55 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017 
-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf; Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Ex-
amination Activities 2016, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT ¶¶ 205-13 (Nov.  14, 2016), https://ww 
w.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf. 
 35 Public Redacted Version of “Request for Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant 
to Article 15” Regarding Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-
02/17-7, ¶187-252 (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_0689 
1.PDF. 
 36 American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 
899 (2002). 
 37 Alex Whiting, An ICC Investigation of the U.S. in Afghanistan: What Does it Mean?, 
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46687/icc-investigation-u-s-
afghanistan-mean/. 
 38 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_O 
TP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf. 
 39 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT (June 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-Policy-Paper-on-
Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf. 
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civilian populations and sexual and gender-based crimes directed against 
women and girls. 
Moreover, because the ICC is a court of last resort that is complementary 
to national justice proceedings—with genuine domestic processes as the first 
line of defense and of justice—the United States could and should have ex-
amined more systematically and transparently40 both what it has done domes-
tically in response to allegations of mistreatment and torture of detainees after 
9/11 and what more it can do credibly to advance accountability domesti-
cally.41 
Indeed, the United States should be more transparent and forthcoming— 
first and foremost to the American people—about what steps it has taken do-
mestically to come to terms with the post-9/11 mistreatment and torture of 
detainees documented in the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
Report (conduct opposed by many military officers42 and civilian officials at 
the time).  The American people deserve to know more about what has been 
done domestically to advance accountability and what more realistically could 
be done. 
Fourth and relatedly, the Trump Administration should have strongly and 
explicitly affirmed that it unequivocally opposes torture and that it will abide 
by U.S. treaty and statutory obligations against torture, just as the Obama Ad-
ministration did.43  This is the right and lawful thing to do.  These steps would 
help reinforce and solidify that the U.S. system has self-corrected.  Such do-
mestic steps could strengthen U.S. complementarity arguments.  They could 
have also encouraged an ICC prosecutorial focus on ongoing Taliban crimes 
as a matter of prioritization under the Prosecutor’s own policy.44 
In short, the United States could have taken meaningful steps to protect 
U.S. interests and U.S. personnel effectively without undermining the 
 
 40 Pomper, supra note 31. 
 41 David Bosco, A Former U.S. Envoy’s Thoughts on ICC Scrutiny of the United States, 
LAWFARE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/former-us-envoys-thoughts-
icc-scrutiny-united-states (citing and quoting Ambassador Stephen Rapp). 
 42 Neil A. Lewis, Military’s Opposition to Harsh Interrogation is Outlined, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 28, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/28/politics/militarys-opposition-to-
harsh-interrogation-is-outlined.html. 
43 Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 C.F.R. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009); Tom Malinowski, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and Labor before the UN Committee 
Against Torture (Nov. 12-13, 2014) (affirming that “torture, and cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment and punishment are forbidden in all places, at all times, with no excep-
tions”).  Former Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, likewise made clear his strong opposi-
tion to torture under any circumstances.  See Sheri Fink & Helene Cooper, Inside Trump 
Defense Secretary Pick’s Efforts to Halt Torture, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/01/02/us/politics/james-mattis-defense-secretary-trump.html?_r=2. 
 44 Alex Whiting, No Winners: How the Int’l Criminal Court Should Avoid Confronting 
the United States, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/49680/win 
ners-intl-criminal-court-avoid-confronting-united-states/. 
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possibilities of justice for victims of mass atrocities that the ICC can offer and 
without undercutting its work to catalyze national accountability—the pri-
mary and most important foundation for justice and the rule of law. 
III. THE PATH NOT TAKEN 
Unfortunately, this was not the path taken by the Trump Administration.  
Instead of pursuing such an approach, the Administration opted for a “deep 
strike” version of a defensive agenda replete with bullying threats against ICC 
personnel—threatening visa bans, sanctions, and even prosecution—if the 
ICC proceeded to open an investigation against the United States.45  A week 
after the United States confirmed that it had revoked the ICC Prosecutor’s 
visa,46 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (before whom the matter had been pending 
for months) issued its decision denying the Prosecutor’s request to open an 
investigation into the Afghanistan situation, saying that it was not in the “in-
terests of justice” to do so “at this stage” because “the prospects for a success-
ful investigation and prosecution [were] extremely limited” in light of a num-
ber of considerations, including uncertain “meaningful cooperation from 
relevant authorities . . . whether in respect of investigations or of surrender of 
suspects.”47 
John Bolton and the White House proceeded to declare “victory.”48  Bolton 
proudly claimed success for his strident opposition to the ICC and jubilantly 
re-read the portion of his September 2018 speech, declaring that “the ICC is 
already dead to us.”49  We may never know exactly what influence the aggres-
sive U.S. threats may have had on the Court’s deliberations, but the result—
shutting down a possible Afghanistan investigation—was exactly what Bolton 
and the Trump Administration wanted. 
 
45 Bolton Remarks, supra note 1. 
 46 Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing 
Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/wo 
rld/europe/us-icc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html. 
 47 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Case No. ICC-02/17, ¶ 94 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR201 
9_02068.PDF (hereinafter “ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision”). 
 48 Press Release, Donald Trump, President, Statement from the President (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-from-the-president-8/; 
Marlise Simons, Rick Gladstone & Carol Rosenberg, Hague Court Abandons Afghanistan 
War Crimes Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/ 
world/asia/icc-afghanistan-.html. 
 49 Carole Morello, Trump Administration Applauds International Court’s Decision to 
Abandon Afghan War Crimes Probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-applauds-international-courts-
decision-to-abandon-afghan-war-crimes-probe/2019/04/12/610fd2b6-5d4a-11e9-a00e-
050dc7b82693_story.html?utm_term=.6e7d7b8a46aa. 
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But what kind of “victory” is this?  Is it a pyrrhic victory?  Although the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s unexpected and controversial judgment yielded the 
Trump Administration’s desired outcome, the Court’s decision came at a very 
high cost—even for the United States.  Some of these costs flow from the 
Administration’s aggressive approach: the U.S. bullying tactics set a deeply 
problematic example of disrespect for the personnel and judicial processes of 
the ICC.  These tactics also undercut U.S. credibility and stature in advocating 
for accountability for atrocity crimes more generally.  Moreover, within Af-
ghanistan itself—a state party to the ICC—the Pre-Trial Chamber decision 
prevents the ICC Prosecutor from investigating grave, widespread, and ongo-
ing atrocities committed by the Taliban—atrocities that U.S. forces, U.S. gov-
ernment agencies, and U.S. civil society groups have worked tirelessly to 
counter over many years. 
Additional costs flow from the thinly reasoned decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber itself.   The opinion offers a surprisingly brief discussion of comple-
mentarity and gravity.  Also surprising is the Pre-Trial Chamber’s unexpected 
“interests of justice” analysis that runs the risk of incentivizing state non-co-
operation by making it a central factor in its decision declining to open an 
investigation.50 
Just as the United States had other options in its strategy, so too did the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in its reasoning and judgment.  The Chamber could have 
considered the issues of complementarity and gravity more fully.  It could 
have offered a deeper analysis of the “interests of justice” and sought full 
briefing on this crucial issue that could have contributed to a far more nuanced 
assessment.  Given the lack of clear statutory guidance, there is merit in look-
ing at the broader purposes of the Rome Statute;51 but one can reasonably 
question whether the “prevention” of grave atrocity crimes or combating “im-
punity” will be advanced—or rather undercut—by the Chamber’s analysis. 
Moreover, while the Office of the Prosecutor’s relatively narrow interpre-
tation of the “interests of justice” set out in its policy paper52 is certainly open 
to critique, the Pre-Trial Chamber could have sent the matter back to the OTP 
 
 50 Christian De Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big 
Implications, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/ 
no-icc-investigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/.  Presiding 
Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua subsequently issued a concurring separate opinion, join-
ing in the Chamber’s unanimous decision to deny the Prosecutor’s request to open an in-
vestigation in the Afghanistan situation and elaborating his views on the “interests of jus-
tice”—but disagreeing with his colleagues concerning the scope of a potential 
authorization.  Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, 
Case No. ICC-02/17-33-Anx (May 31, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Relat-
edRecords/CR2019_02989.PDF. 
 51 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 47, at ¶ 89. 
 52 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT (Sept. 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf. 
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asking it to consider interests of justice in a fuller manner.  Alternatively, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber could have authorized an investigation, noting concerns 
about cooperation but encouraging the OTP itself to give careful consideration 
to issues of cooperation and prospects for success (which the OTP’s own pol-
icy paper on prioritization clearly addresses).53  These alternative approaches 
would have recognized the inevitable need for prioritization and consideration 
of practical constraints by the OTP rather than presenting judicial reasoning 
and criteria that risk rewarding lack of cooperation.  Furthermore, in stressing 
the length of time that the preliminary examination was open as a key factor 
in its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber also undercuts the OTP’s ability to en-
courage and seek to catalyze domestic accountability through preliminary ex-
aminations—which may well take time to bear fruit. 
In any event, the story is not over on the Afghanistan situation.  On June 
7, 2019, the Prosecution sought leave to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber deci-
sion.54  Three months later, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the OTP leave to 
appeal its decision on the “interests of justice” issues.55  In the meantime, as 
egregious Taliban atrocities continue in Afghanistan, many victims of these 
crimes—deeply disappointed by the Chamber’s initial decision—no doubt 
will continue to argue, with strong support, that the “interests of justice” re-
quire some meaningful accountability.56  Civil society organizations will 
 
 53 This could have enabled the OTP to prioritize cases, likely against the Taliban, where 
possibilities for success in gathering evidence and building cases might have been greater.  
Kevin Jon Heller, One Word for the PTC on the Interests of Justice: Taliban, OPINIOJURIS 
(Apr. 13, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/13/one-word-for-the-ptc-on-the-interests-
of-justice-taliban/. 
 54 Office of the Prosecutor, Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Case No. ICC-02/17 (June 7, 2019), https://www.icc 
-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03060.PDF. 
55 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Prosecutor and Victims’ Requests for 
Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authori-
zation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,’ Case 
No. ICC-02/17, ¶¶ 34-39 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019 
_05649.PDF. 
 56 As Kevin Jon Heller poignantly asks regarding Taliban atrocities: “How could it not 
be in the interests of justice for the OTP to investigate the gravest and most numerous 
crimes in the Afghanistan situation?”  Heller, supra note 53.  The Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), in its statement responding to the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber’s decision, expressed regret and argued “this decision does not serve the interests of 
justice, actually, it contributes to culture of impunity.”  Press Release, AIHRC, Press 
Release on the Rejection of the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’s Request to 
Investigate into the Situation in Afghanistan (Apr. 13, 2019).  See also Huma Saeed, A 
Slap in the Face of Justice: The ICC and Afghanistan, SECURITYPRAXIS (May 8, 2019), 
https://securitypraxis.eu/afghanistan-icc/ (“Let war survivors decide what they think is 
best for themselves and their interests about justice.  They wanted an investigation and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected it.  Suggesting that it was for their own good amounts to 
the Afghan popular saying of putting salt to one’s wound.”). 
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continue to document ongoing atrocities in Afghanistan and press for justice 
even if the ICC is not at the center of those efforts. 
If there is any silver lining, it is that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment—
on top of other ICC developments over the last year or so—is triggering far 
more searching and candid assessments regarding the challenges and future 
of the ICC and the need to combine ambition with greater realism.57  Recent 
developments—including fractured and sometimes poorly reasoned judicial 
decisions; prosecutorial challenges in presenting evidence sufficient to meet 
its burden of proof; and judicial squabbling over pay increases, among oth-
ers—have exposed deep internal issues and dysfunctions at the ICC.  On top 
of this is insufficient state support in terms of arrest warrants or funding; op-
position from powerful non-party states; insufficient assistance from the UN 
Security Council; lack of cooperation from a number of states; and several 
withdrawals.  Together these are formidable challenges to the ICC’s capacity 
to fulfill the objectives set for it by the drafters of the Rome Statute.  Houston, 
we do indeed have a problem.58 
Deeply important in finding a constructive path forward for the ICC is the 
need for a more honest assessment of the large gap between the mission given 
to the Court and its current performance and of what it would take to begin to 
close that gap both in terms of internal reforms and external support.  Expec-
tations of what the ICC can actually contribute—through its own proceedings 
and track record and its larger catalyzing effects—need to be realistic and 
well-informed.  The ICC’s internal institutional capacity and processes need 
to be strengthened and its work bolstered by appropriate and more effective 
state support. 
 
 57 Some recent examples include: Todd Buchwald, The International Criminal Court 
Decision on Afghanistan: Time to Start a New Conversation, JUST SECURITY (April 13, 
2019),  https://www.justsecurity.org/63622/the-international-criminal-court-decision-on-
afghanistan-time-to-start-a-new-conversation/; Mark Kersten, Whither the Aspirational 
ICC, Welcome the ‘Practical’ Court?, EJIL: TALK! (May 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk. 
org/whither-the-aspirational-icc-welcome-the-practical-court/; Prince Zeid Raad Al Hus-
sein, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Christian Wenaweser & Tiina Intelman, The International 
Criminal Court Needs Fixing, ATL. COUNCIL (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.atlantic-
council.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-international-criminal-court-needs-fixing; Douglas 
Guilfoyle, Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is it Time for the Assembly of 
States Parties to be the Adults in the Room?, EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2019), https://www.ejil 
talk.org/author/dguilfoyle/. 
 58 For thoughtful analysis, see Douglas Guilfoyle’s three-part series in EJIL: Talk!.  
Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I – This is Not Fine: The ICC in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-
trouble/; Douglas Guilfoyle, Part II - This is Not Fine: The ICC in Trouble, EJIL: TALK!  
(Mar. 22, 2019),  https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-crimi-
nal-court-in-trouble/; Douglas Guilfoyle, Part III – This is Not Fine: The ICC in Trouble, 
EJIL: TALK!  (Mar. 25, 2019),  https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-this-is-not-fine-the-inter-
national-criminal-court-in-trouble/. 
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None of this will be easy or straightforward, especially given disagree-
ments and lack of clarity on many of the key principles that are supposed to 
guide the Court’s work, including complementarity, gravity, and interests of 
justice.  Some mid-course corrections may be forged through internal reforms 
and strategy adjustments—such as the OTP’s latest draft strategic plan, which 
indicates a willingness to place greater emphasis on mid-level defendants 
where the prospects for building successful cases may be greater.59  Other 
matters may require adjustment and greater guidance from the Assembly of 
States Parties. 
In all of this, it is crucially important to remember that the ICC is designed 
to be a court of last resort.  Perhaps setting more modest expectations for the 
Court—while reaffirming the primacy and importance of strengthening jus-
tice on the ground—would be a helpful place to start.  Far greater attention 
and support by states and civil society organizations to domestically-based 
courts in promising circumstances, including innovative hybrid arrange-
ments—with the ICC truly as a last resort in those unique circumstances where 
it is vitally needed and likely to be supported and effective—may not be the 
clarion call or vision of justice that many at Rome had in mind.  But it may be 
more likely to lead there over time. 
In any path ahead, what is absolutely crucial is clearly affirming the legal 
prohibitions against atrocities, preventing these horrific crimes, and seeking 
meaningful justice for victims even if the mechanisms of enforcement and 
accountability need to be both stronger and more varied.  The unacceptability 
of atrocities—as a normative matter—should not be obscured by disagree-
ment over particular enforcement mechanisms, as Saira Mohamed thought-
fully argues.60  Yet, too often this is what happens. 
IV. IS THERE A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY AHEAD? 
For the rest of the Trump Administration, the U.S.-ICC relationship will 
continue to be fraught and marked by tensions.  It is hard to imagine John 
Bolton or Secretary of State Pompeo having anything positive to say about 
any aspect of the ICC’s work.  Indeed, Bolton’s fervently stated and 
longstanding desire is to kill the ICC.61 
 
 59 Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals Important Strategy Shift in New Policy Docu-
ment, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecutor-
signals-important-strategy-shift-in-new-policy-document/; Office of the Prosecutor, Stra-
tegic Plan, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocu-
ments/20190726-strategic-plan-eng.pdf. 
 60 Saira Mohamed, States Parties, Non-States Parties, and the Idea of International 
Community, 47 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 635 (2019). 
 61 John Bolton, The Hague Aims for U.S. Soldiers: A ‘War Crimes’ Inquiry in Afghani-
stan Shows the Danger of the International Criminal Court, Op. Ed., WALL STREET J. (Nov. 
20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-hague-tiptoes-toward-u-s-soldiers-15112171- 
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But what might be possible in a new administration?  That is not an easy 
question.  It will certainly take a long time to overcome the damage inflicted 
by Bolton’s shrill attacks, threats and exaggerated critiques.  A future admin-
istration might opt for some degree of careful reengagement and could, like 
the Obama Administration and the second George W. Bush Administration, 
recognize the valuable role the ICC can sometimes play, finding a more con-
structive way to pursue an affirmative agenda—and support important aspects 
of the ICC’s work—while astutely navigating defensive concerns.  Hopefully, 
the United States will look for ways to advance justice and accountability for 
atrocity crimes through a variety of mechanisms—domestic, hybrid, regional, 
and international.  And in so doing, the United States must affirm and rein-
force its own domestic willingness and ability to hold its own personnel ac-
countable.62 
The one thing the United States should not do is waver in its commitment 
to seek accountability for egregious international crimes.  Indeed, it is vital to 
keep in mind the deep U.S. interests and long-term stakes in continuing to 
advance justice for mass atrocities.  Bipartisan outrage over the Assad re-
gime’s use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians in Syria and over 
widespread torture and murder in its prisons, documented by the Caesar pho-
tos;63 condemnation of ISIS’s horrific atrocities, including summary execu-
tions, sexual slavery, and genocide;64 outrage over the brutal atrocities against 
the Rohingya at the hands of Myanmar military forces;65 and revulsion over 
widespread rape in many conflicts around the world, has motivated Americans 
across the political spectrum to stand up and say this must stop. 
 
36 (“America should welcome the opportunity . . . to strangle the ICC in its cradle.”); 
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all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us.”). 
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In short, as the U.S. government navigates any current or future challenges 
with the ICC, it can and should do so in ways that support justice and account-
ability for horrific mass atrocity crimes.  To be sure, seeking credible justice 
is extraordinarily difficult work, yet some things are clear.  The need for more 
effective prevention and accountability is as urgent as ever, as egregious atroc-
ities devastate victims and communities in so many conflicts across the globe.  
Expectations of justice and accountability for such crimes are increasing, and 
victims and affected communities—as well as civil society organizations and 
states—will look for ways to mobilize to achieve that goal. 
Sometimes the ICC will be able to provide justice, and even if not, it will 
often be a galvanizing and tangible symbol of the importance of the struggle.  
At the same time, the ICC is only a part of a larger terrain of ways to seek 
justice, and those other ways—most notably credible national processes, when 
possible, as well as innovative hybrids, among others—will often be crucial 
to pursuing a fuller measure of justice and accountability for atrocity crimes, 
ensuring fair processes, and potentially helping to strengthen deterrence and 
prevention. 
The quest for justice may be daunting, but the need is so enormous, and 
the demand is growing, and even small steps and achievements can provide a 
“ripple of hope”66 that together can help build a stronger “current” of account-
ability and prevention.  U.S. policy should contribute to, and not undercut, 
those ripples of hope, affirming that the norms against egregious atrocities are 
universal, even if modes of enforcement will vary.  Advancing justice and 
prevention more effectively should be an objective that enjoys common 
ground. 
 
 66 As the late Robert F. Kennedy said in his speech in Cape Town, South Africa in 1966: 
“Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out 
against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million 
different centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current which can sweep down 
the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.”  Robert F. Kennedy, Day of Affirmation 
Speech at the University of Cape Town, South Africa (June 6, 1966). 

